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Market selection in large economies: Amatter of luck
Filippo Massari
School of Banking and Finance, University of New South Wales
In a general equilibrium model with a continuum of traders and bounded aggre-
gate endowment, I investigate the market selection hypothesis that markets favor
traders with accurate beliefs. Contrary to known results for economies with (only)
finitely many traders, I find that risk attitudes affect traders’ survival and that mar-
kets can favor “lucky” traders with incorrect beliefs over “skilled” traders with ac-
curate beliefs. My model allows for a clear distinction between luck and skills, and
it shows that market selection forces induce efficient prices even when accurate
traders do not survive in the long run.
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1. Introduction
According to the market selection hypothesis (MSH henceforth), the market rewards
the traders with the most accurate beliefs. This hypothesis, first articulated by Alchian
(1950) and Friedman (1953), is one of the key arguments that supports the efficiency of
financial markets. Under the MSH, markets become efficient because, in the long run,
it is the accurate traders who control most of the wealth and determine asset prices.
Since Milton Friedman’s work, a number of papers have studied the connection be-
tween the MSH and efficiency. Sandroni (2000) and Blume and Easley (2006) show that
in general equilibrium models with complete markets, bounded aggregate endowment
and finitely many traders with time-separable preferences, the MSH holds and equi-
librium prices eventually reflect the beliefs of the most accurate traders in the econ-
omy. However, there are several models in which the MSH fails and prices remain
asymptotically inefficient. Negative results hold in partial equilibrium models with a
continuum of traders (De Long et al. 1991). in temporal equilibrium models in which
traders optimize on how to allocate consumption but do not optimize over their savings
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(Blume and Easley 1992), in general equilibrium models in which the aggregate endow-
ment either grows without bound or shrinks to zero (Yan 2008), and in general equilib-
rium models with nonseparable preferences (Borovicˇka 2018, Dindo 2018).
While these findings suggest that the MSH and asymptotic efficiency are equivalent
concepts, Kogan et al. (2006), Cvitanic´ and Malamud (2011), and Cvitanic´ et al. (2012)
demonstrate the opposite. The MSH is not a sufficient condition for market efficiency. In
economies with no intermediate consumption, they show that inaccurate traders who
vanish can have an everlasting effect on equilibrium prices. In those cases in which
inaccurate traders are overconfident on assets that pay on extremely unlikely events,
markets can remain inefficient even if all inaccurate traders vanish.
In this paper, I show that the MSH is not necessary for market efficiency. I present a
model in which accurate traders lose all their wealth, luck (which I define in Section 2.2)
determines which trader survives, and yet markets become efficient in the sense that
asymptotic prices of short-lived assets reflect correct beliefs.
My model generalizes Sandroni (2000) and Blume and Easley (2006) settings by al-
lowing for a continuum of trader types (indexed by their beliefs). In what follows, I
use small economies to refer to economies with finitely many trader types and large
economies to indicate economies with a continuum of trader types. Allowing for a rich
heterogeneity in trader beliefs alters some of the results of the standard model. While
markets are asymptotically efficient in both settings, in large economies the MSH can
fail because luck and risk attitudes can play a role in traders’ survival.
I begin my paper by presenting an example in which the market selects against
traders with correct beliefs, luck determines traders’ survival, and asymptotic equilib-
rium prices reflect accurate beliefs. Two conditions are necessary for this result. First,
luck can determine survival only if there is a sufficiently rich heterogeneity of beliefs.
Imagine an environment with a continuum of traders who are incorrect in the sense
that every trader concentrates his beliefs on a different set of paths that individually
have a vanishing probability under the correct measure P , but collectively cover the
whole set of paths. Then the group is sufficiently diverse so that for every path, there is a
(lucky) trader who allocates consumption exactly along this path. Ultimately, it is always
one trader from that group who accumulates consumption in the long run (a different
trader along every path) and, thus, the group collectively accumulates all consumption
in the long run along every path. Second, so as to generate this effect, one needs pref-
erences that are sufficiently elastic. The reason is that each trader believes he is earning
a high subjective return on his savings along the particular paths that he believes are
likely. A constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) parameter smaller than 1 increases his
chances of survival because it gives him enough incentive to save. Contrary to Sandroni
(2000) and Blume and Easley (2006), the curvature of preferences matters because, al-
though aggregate consumption is bounded, the consumption of an infinitesimal trader
can become unbounded and so, individually, we are in the unbounded setting of
Yan (2008).1
1I am thankful to an anonymous referee for providing this interpretation of my result.
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In the rest of the paper, I develop the formal theory needed to discuss selection
in large economies and to understand my leading example. In the tradition of the se-
lection literature, I propose a survival index and use it to derive a sufficient condition
for a positive mass of traders (henceforth a cluster of traders) to vanish that applies to
both small and large economies. My survival index generalizes those found in the lit-
erature by including a new term that captures the effect of risk attitudes on the aggre-
gate savings of those clusters where traders have heterogeneous beliefs. Everything else
equal, a cluster where traders have a higher CRRA parameter vanishes against a cluster
where traders have a lower CRRA parameter because it has a lower aggregate savings
rate. In Section 6, I present my main result. Even in those cases in which the MSH fails,
markets are asymptotically efficient: the prices of short-lived assets eventually reflect
correct beliefs whenever there is a positive mass of traders with correct beliefs. There
are three appendices. In Appendix A, I reconcile the apparent contrast between the
selection results in small and large economies. Proofs are provided in Appendices B
and C.
2. A precise definition of luck
2.1 Probabilistic environment
The model is an infinite horizon Arrow–Debreu exchange economy with complete mar-
kets for a unique perishable consumption good. Time is discrete and begins at date 0. At
each date, the economy can be in S mutually exclusive states: S = {1     S}, with Carte-
sian product S t = ×tS . The set of all infinite sequences of states, paths, is S∞ = ×∞S ,
with representative path σ = (σ1   ). The equality σt = (σ1    σt) denotes the par-
tial history until period t, C(σt) is the cylinder set with base σt , C(σt) = {σ ∈ S∞|σ =
(σt   )}, t is the σ-algebra generated by the cylinders, and  is the σ-algebra gener-
ated by their union. By construction, {t} is a filtration. Next, I introduce a number
of economic (random) variables with time index t. These variables are adapted to the
filtration t .
The true probability measure on (S∞) is P , while each trader has a subjective,
possibly incorrect, probabilistic view pi on (S∞). For any probability measure p on
(S∞), p(σt |σt−1) is the probability of a generic outcome in period t conditional on
observing history σt−1, while p(σt) is the probability of the cylinder with base σt , that
is, p(σt) = p(C(σt)) = p({σ1} × · · · × {σt} × S × S × · · · ). With an abuse of notation,
p(σt) also indicates the likelihood of p on the first t realization of path σ . For exam-
ple, if S = {01} and pi is independent and identically distributed (iid) Bernoulli (for all
t, pi(σt = 1) = i), then pi(σt) =∏tτ=1pi(στ|στ−1) = it1(1 − i)t0 , where t1 and t0 denote
the number of realizations of states 1 and 0 on the first t realization of path σ , respec-
tively.
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2.2 Belief accuracy and luck
Following an established tradition in the selection literature, I rank traders’ accuracy
according to the relative likelihood of their beliefs.2,3
Definition 1. Trader i is more accurate than trader j if limt→∞pi(σt)/pj(σt) = ∞ P-
a.s. He is as accurate as trader j if limt→∞pi(σt)/pj(σt) ∈ (0∞) P-a.s. He is less accurate
than trader j if limt→∞pi(σt)/pj(σt)= 0 P-a.s.
Because no trader beliefs can be more accurate than the true probability, I say that a
trader has skills if his beliefs are as accurate as the true probability, while he has no skills
if his beliefs are less accurate.
Definition 2. Trader i
• has skills if limt→∞pi(σt)/P(σt) > 0 P-a.s.
• has no skills if limt→∞pi(σt)/P(σt)= 0 P-a.s.
Definition 2 does not rule out the possibility of learning. However, a learning trader
is skilled only if he is able to learn the truth quickly. To gain intuition, it is useful to recall
the notions of merging and weakmerging (Blackwell and Dubins 1962, Kalai and Lehrer
1994). Trader i’s beliefs (weakly) merge with the truth if he eventually learns the true
probability of (events in the near future) tail events, P-a.s. Because learning the proba-
bilities of tail events is harder than learning the probabilities of events in the near future,
merging implies weak merging but not vice versa (Kalai and Lehrer 1994). According to
Definition 2, a trader whose beliefs merge with the truth has skills, while a trader whose
beliefs do not merge with the truth has no skills, even if his beliefs weakly merge with
the truth.
Being skilled is a predetermined characteristic of a trader. It does not depend on em-
pirical evidence because the likelihood ratio condition must hold on a set of sequences
with true probability 1 to occur rather than on the realized path. Skilled traders are
of interest because they are expected to be more accurate than others and thus sur-
vive (e.g., Sandroni 2000, Proposition 3). However, traders’ performance depends on
the likelihood their beliefs attach to the realized path, rather than an abstract notion
of accuracy. The next definition refines the notion of skills by incorporating empirical
evidence.
2Focusing on beliefs’ likelihood is in the tradition of the selection literature; however, unlike San-
droni (2000) and Blume and Easley (2006), I cannot rely on approximate measures of it. My result cap-
tures O(log t) differences between traders’ log likelihoods. Sandroni’s definition (average accuracy) is too
coarse to capture these differences because the averaging factor, O(t−1), dominates this rate, while Blume–
Easley’s definition can lead to incorrect results when describing such small differences (Massari 2013,
2017).
3Definitions 1, 2, and 3, do not cover the case in which limt→∞pi(σt)/pj(σt) does not exist. This case is
left unspecified because it does not play a role in my results and is potentially distracting.
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Definition 3. Trader i is
• empirically accurate on σ if limt→∞pi(σt)/P(σt) > 0 on σ
• empirically inaccurate on σ if limt→∞pi(σt)/P(σt)= 0 on σ .
Being empirically accurate depends on the path on which the condition is verified.
Unlike skills, empirical accuracy is not a predetermined characteristic of a trader. The
two definitions are similar but not equivalent. Although a trader with skills is empiri-
cally accurate on a set of sequences of true probability 1, there are many paths in which
a trader with no skills is empirically accurate; for example, a measure 1 of sequences
according to the unskilled trader beliefs.
I say that a trader is lucky if he has no skills and is empirically accurate, that is, if he
is empirically accurate against the odds.
Definition 4. Trader i is lucky on path σ if he has no skills and is empirically accurate
on σ :
lim
t→∞p
i
(
σt
)
/P
(
σt
)= 0 P-a.s. and lim
t→∞p
i
(
σt
)
/P
(
σt
)
> 0 on σ
This definition of luck is very stringent: it requires an event of zero probability to
occur. Furthermore, because the beliefs of a lucky trader are incorrect P-a.s., luck is not
a sufficient condition for learning.
In small economies, the probability of observing at least one lucky trader is 0 because
each unskilled trader has zero true probability to be lucky and the countable union of
zero probability events has probability zero. On the contrary, there are large economies
in which the probability of observing a lucky trader is 1. The set of sequences in which
at least one unskilled trader is empirically accurate can be made large enough to cover
a set of sequences that has true probability 1 because the uncountable union of zero
probability events can have positive probability.
Example 1. Suppose a fair coin is tossed t times and that there are 2t traders. Each
trader believes that the coin will deliver a distinct deterministic sequence of length t.
Because the number of possible sequences (2t ) and the number of traders coincides, to
every sequence, σt , there corresponds a trader who believes that σt will occur for sure.
That is, for every σˆ t there is a (lucky) trader, iˆ(σˆ t), for whom the probability of obtaining
a favorable realization is extremely low, P{σt ∈ St : piˆ(σt)/P(σt) > 0} = 1/2t , but whose
beliefs attach more likelihood to σˆ t than the true probability does, piˆ(σˆt)/P(σˆt) = 2t .
With t = ∞, this belief structure illustrates a setting in which I have a lucky trader for
every sequence. ♦
While Example 1 illustrates a simple case of luck, my results do not apply to its set-
ting. The belief structure of Example 1 is incompatible with the existence of the com-
petitive equilibrium because it requires “too many” distinct beliefs and thus “too many”
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distinct consumption allocations.4 The beliefs structure I will use in the rest of the paper
requires only one distinct allocation per frequency—a number that grows polynomially
in t—rather than one distinct allocation per sequence—a number that grows exponen-
tially in t.
3. The leading example
Consider a discrete time Arrow–Debreu exchange economy with two states S = {WR},
one perishable consumption good, dynamically complete markets, and no aggregate
risk. There are two sets of traders with positive masses: AU and AS (clusters of traders,
according to Definition 6 in Section 4). Individual traders, i, can have different beliefs,
pi, but share an identical CRRA utility function (ui(c)= (c1−γ − 1)/(1− γ)) with param-
eter γ < 1 and discount factor β. Every individual trader in the economy solves
max
{cit (σ)}∞t=0
Epi
∞∑
t=0
βtui
(
cit(σ)
)
s.t.
∑
t=0
∑
σ
qt(σ)
(
cit(σ)− eit(σ)
)
)≤ 0
where Epi is the expectation according to trader i’s beliefs, and c
i
t(σ), e
i
t(σ), and qt(σ)
are trader i’s consumption, his endowment, and equilibrium prices (of a unit of con-
sumption) in period t on the sequence of realizations σ , respectively.
For j = US, Cjt (σ) =
∫
Aj
cit(σ)di is period t aggregate consumption on path σ of
cluster Aj . In the tradition of the selection literature, the asymptotic fate of a cluster
is coarsely characterized by the distinction between disappearance and nondisappear-
ance.
Definition 5. Cluster Aj vanishes on σ if limt→∞Cjt (σ) = 0; it survives on σ if
limsupt→∞C
j
t (σ) > 0; it dominates on σ if the other cluster vanishes on σ .
The true probability of the states evolves according to the following (Pólya urn) pro-
cess PPolya (Pólya 1930, Mahmoud 2008). The process starts with an urn containing one
white ball (W ) and one red ball (R). At the beginning of each period, a ball is randomly
selected from the urn to determine the state of the economy. The selected ball is then
returned to the urn along with one new ball of the same color.
Traders in AS (skilled traders) are allowed to observe the composition of the urn
before every draw. They have correct beliefs, for all i ∈AS and pi = PPolya, and represent
a group of traders with inside information.
Traders in AU (unskilled traders) have heterogeneous iid beliefs about the probabil-
ity of R. The union of unskilled trader beliefs covers the simplex so that, with an abuse of
notation, AU = {i ∈	U = (01)}, where i denotes both trader i and his iid beliefs: for all
t and i, pi(Rt) = i. The unskilled cluster collects the different opinions of those traders
who, not having access to private information, never change their beliefs. Because the
4To ensure the existence of the competitive equilibrium, the cardinality of the consumption space must
be at most countable (Ostroy 1984).
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composition of the urn changes over time, PPolya is not iid and all traders in AU have
incorrect beliefs.
Traders’ first-order conditions of the maximization problem are sufficient for the
Pareto optimum and, in every path σt , can be expressed as (cit (σ))
γ = (ci0)γβtpi(σt)/
qt(σ), where pi(σt) is the probability attached by trader i to path σt and ci0 is his time 0
consumption. Rearranging and aggregating over traders of the same cluster yields
C
j
t (σ)=
∫
Aj
cit(σ)di= βt
1
γ
∫
Aj
pi
(
σt
) 1
γ ci0 di
qt(σ)
1
γ
 (1)
Exponentiating by γ and taking the ratio of clusters’ aggregate consumption gives
CSt (σ)
γ
CUt (σ)
γ
=
(∫
AS
PPolya
(
σt
) 1
γ ci0 di
)γ
(∫
AU
pi
(
σt
) 1
γ ci0 di
)γ =
PPolya
(
σt
)(∫
AS
ci0 di
)γ
(∫
AU
pi
(
σt
) 1
γ ci0 di
)γ  (2)
The asymptotic value of (2) determines which cluster vanishes. Later in the paper I de-
velop a method to determine its value. I will show (i) that de Finetti’s theorem allows the
Polya urn process to be turned into a probability that is parametrizable by 	= [01],
∀(tσ) PPolya
(
σt
)= ∫ 1
0
pi
(
σt
)
di
and (ii) that
(∫
Aj
pi
(
σt
) 1
γ ci0 di
)γ
=
[∫
Aj
pi
(
σt
)
di
]
∗ [e−( γ−12 ) ln t+O(1)]
These results (Corollaries 2 and 1, respectively) allows the rewriting of (2) as
CSt (σ)
γ
CUt (σ)
γ
=
∫ 1
0
pi
(
σt
)
di
(∫
AS
ci0 di
)γ
[∫
Aj
pi
(
σt
)
di
]
∗ [e−( γ−12 ) ln t+O(1)]  (3)
which shows that (2) converges to 0 (with probability arbitrarily close to 1). That is, the
skilled cluster vanishes5 and the MSH fails.
This example can be fairly surprising at first glance. All the skilled traders have cor-
rect beliefs, all the unskilled traders have incorrect beliefs, and yet skilled traders vanish.
Next I give a preview of the results.
5Because the aggregate endowment is bounded, (CSt (σ)/C
U
t (σ))
γ → 0⇒ CSt (σ)→ 0.
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3.1 The role played by risk attitudes
Risk attitudes affect cluster survival because of cluster AU ’s belief heterogeneity. If all
traders in AU had identical and incorrect beliefs (as for small economies), their beliefs
could be taken out of the integral in (2), the consumption ratio between the two clusters
would be proportional to the likelihood ratio between cluster beliefs, and risk attitudes
would not affect cluster survival. The skilled cluster would dominate because it is more
accurate than the unskilled cluster.
However, because unskilled traders do not have identical beliefs, the right-hand side
of (2) does not represent the ratio between two probabilities. de Finetti’s theorem (Corol-
lary 2) allows the exchange of the Polya urn process for a probability that is parametriz-
able by 	= [01], i.e., for all (tσ), PPolya(σt)=
∫ 1
0 p
i(σt)di, and allows us to rewrite (3)
as
CSt (σ)
γ
CUt (σ)
γ
=
PPolya
(
σt
)(∫
AS
ci0 di
)γ
(∫
AU
pi
(
σt
) 1
γ ci0 di
)γ =
PPolya
(
σt
)
βt
(∫
AS
ci0 di
)γ
PPolya
(
σt
)
βte−
γ−1
2 ln t+O(1)
 (4)
The numerator is proportional to the product of the true probability of σt and the dis-
count factor βt , because (
∫
AS
ci0 di)
γ is a finite positive constant. The denominator has
an aggregate probability term, PPolya(σt), which coincides with the true probability of
σt , and an aggregate discount factor term, βte−
γ−1
2 ln t , which also depends on cluster
AU ’s CRRA parameter. The comparison of cluster probability terms reveals that un-
skilled traders collectively behave as if they had correct beliefs, even if all unskilled trader
has incorrect beliefs. Accordingly, the asymptotic fate of the two clusters is uniquely de-
termined by their aggregate discount factor. With γ < 1, (4) implies that the unskilled
cluster has a higher savings rate than the skilled cluster. The unskilled cluster dominates
because its aggregate beliefs are identical to the skilled cluster’s and it saves more.
3.2 Who dominates?
Equation (4) shows that both clusters have equivalent aggregate beliefs and that cluster
selection solely depends on the effect of unskilled traders’ risk attitudes on their aggre-
gate discount factor. However, it is not informative enough to indicate how consump-
tion shares are eventually distributed among unskilled traders. In Section 5.3, I demon-
strate that within members of the unskilled cluster that dominates, the selection forces
favor lucky traders. That is, those traders whose iid beliefs coincide with the empirical
frequency of R. The intuition goes as follows.
de Finetti’s (1937) theorem (Corollary 2) allows turning the Polya urn process into
a probability that is parametrizable by 	= [01]: for all (tσ), PPolya(σt)=
∫ 1
0 p
i(σt)di.
Therefore, the Pólya urn process produces probabilities that are equivalent in distribu-
tion to the probabilities obtained using the following two-step procedure. In the first
step, Nature randomizes according to a Uniform distribution on (01) to decide the
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probability of red: p(R). In the second step, Nature uses p(R) to generate an iid se-
quence of length t. Skilled traders have skills because they know that Nature is choos-
ing p(R) at random according to a Uniform distribution, limt→∞ PPolya(σt)/PPolya(σt)=
1 PPolya-a.s. Unskilled traders have no skills because each unskilled trader believes that
there is a unique possible probability pi(R)= i and according to the randomization per-
formed by Nature in the first step, each i ∈ (01) has 0 probability to be the realized value
of p(R) for all i ∈ AU , P1ststep({p(R) = i}) = 0 ⇒ limt→∞pi(σt)/PPolya(σt) = 0 PPolya-a.s.
However, the union of unskilled trader beliefs covers the entire simplex. Thus, for every
possible realization of p(R), there is a (lucky) unskilled trader, iˆ, whose belief coincides
with p(R). Among unskilled traders, the market selects for iˆ because, conditional on
p(R)= iˆ, iˆ is the only accurate trader in the economy.
Assume an exchangeable non-iid process (such as the Pólya urn described) plays a
fundamental role in identifying luck at a theoretical level. If the true parameter were
constant, it would be impossible to distinguish a trader who uses the correct param-
eter by chance from a trader who truly knows the true parameter. By contrast, in the
Pólya urn described, there is no room for confusion. A trader with correct beliefs knows
the true parameter in every period, while a trader is lucky if he incorrectly believes the
true parameter to be constant and, by chance, his iid beliefs coincide with the realized
frequency of red balls.
3.3 Domarkets become asymptotically efficient?
Markets do become asymptotically efficient: the asymptotic equilibrium prices of the
short-lived assets in a large homogeneous discount factor economy with a positive mass
of skilled traders reflect correct beliefs even when the market selects against all skilled
traders (Section 6). In the leading example, the intuition is as follows: By standard eco-
nomic arguments, as the consumption share of lucky traders approaches 1, the equilib-
rium prices of the short-lived assets converge to their discounted beliefs. The result fol-
lows by noticing that as the number of trading periods increases, the number of balls in
the urn also increases, making the composition of the urn more stable. Asymptotically,
the effect of one extra ball per period becomes negligible and the Pólya urn process is
indistinguishable from iid extractions from an urn whose composition coincides with
the empirical frequency (i.e., the beliefs of the lucky trader).
This result holds in general. If there is a positive mass of traders with correct be-
liefs and the MSH holds, the market becomes efficient by standard arguments in mar-
ket selection (Sandroni 2000). Otherwise, in Section 5.4, I show that violations of the
MSH can occur only if the economy has a large number of traders, preferences are
sufficiently elastic, and the data-generating process is such that the true maximum-
likelihood parameter is a random variable with continuum support. That is, markets
can select against accurate traders only in those cases in which Nature can be thought
of as choosing its parameters at random. Markets are asymptotically efficient because
in these cases, the next period beliefs of the lucky trader and the truth are eventually
indistinguishable.6
6This result does not apply to the setting of Example 1, which violates Assumptions C3 and A4 in Sections
4.1 and 4.2, respectively. For instance, it is easy to verify that the lucky trader’s beliefs never converge to the
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4. The general model
4.1 The traders in the economy
The economy has N sets of traders with positive measure, clusters Aj , j = 1    N . The
(atomless) traders of each cluster are indexed by i, and are assumed to have identical
utility function and discount factor. Each trader, i, has beliefs pi, endowment pro-
cesses eit(σ), and (infinitesimal) time 0 consumption c
i
0. The measure space of traders
is (AA i), where A := ×Nj=1Aj is a subset of Rk for some k <∞, A is its Borel subsets,
and i is the Lebesgue measure.
Definition 6. A cluster, Aj , is a positive measure of traders such that the following
statements hold:
C1. Cluster Aj has strictly positive time 0 consumption: C
j
0 =
∫
Aj
ci0 di > 0.
C2. Traders in Aj have an identical discount factor βj ∈ (01) and preferences.
C3. One of the following three conditions on trader beliefs holds:
(i) All traders in Aj have identical beliefs.
(ii) All traders in Aj are Bayesian with regular priors on the same support.
(iii) All traders in Aj have multinomial beliefs with the same intertemporal struc-
ture (either iid or Markov with finitely many lags) and the union of their be-
liefs covers the whole simplex.
Assumption C1 requires the initial (equilibrium) consumption of each cluster to be
strictly positive.7 Assumption C2 is necessary to obtain an analytical form for clusters’
optimal consumption decisions as a function of its discount factor, preferences, and ag-
gregate beliefs. Assumption C3 disciplines clusters’ aggregate beliefs, and one of the fol-
lowing alternatives holds: (i) all traders have identical beliefs—a cluster of agents with
identical beliefs can be treated as a representative trader with positive mass because
its traders also have identical utilities and discount factors (C2); (ii) traders disagree on
small sample probabilities but agree on tail event probabilities—the traders of a cluster
of Bayesians with different (regular) priors on the same support disagree in small sam-
ples because of heterogeneity in the priors but agree in the long run because of learning;
(iii) all traders disagree on both small sample and tail event probabilities—their beliefs
true probability: ∀t, ‖P(σt) − piˆ(σt)‖∞ = |05 − 1| + |05 − 0| = 1 > 0. The reason is technical: the space
of all binary series with the sup norm has too many distinct elements; it is not separable. Therefore, the
competitive equilibrium does not exist because there is no orthonormal basis for the space of consumption
(Ostroy 1984). Back to my interpretation, my result does not hold with a belief structure like Example 1,
because Nature cannot be thought of as randomizing among the set of distinct infinite paths since this
space is not a Lebesgue space.
7Subsets of traders whose initial equilibrium consumption is zero can be ignored without loss of gener-
ality (WLOG) because they cannot affect any equilibrium quantity: since all traders’ preferences satisfy the
Inada condition at 0 (by A1), a cluster optimally chose to consume 0 at the first period only if the value of
its endowment was 0.
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can be aggregated because they at least agree on the intertemporal probabilistic struc-
ture. Assumption C3(iii) requires trader beliefs to be parametric and it ensures that each
parameter represents a trader type. This structure naturally builds a bijection between
the space of parameters and the space of traders, so that the topological properties of
a cluster of traders that satisfies C3(iii), (AjAj i), and those of the space of the pa-
rameters characterizing its traders’ beliefs, (	jBj i), coincide: each trader is uniquely
identified by his beliefs, which are uniquely identified by a vector of parameters. This
observation allows using Aj and 	j interchangeably as the domain of integration.
In the rest of the paper, the Lebesgue dimensionality of the set of parameters 	 plays
a fundamental role in my condition for a cluster to vanish. I use kBIC to indicate the di-
mensionality of 	 when it refers to the prior support of a Bayesian cluster that satisfies
C3(i) or (ii) and I use kMAR to indicate the dimensionality of 	 when it refers to the het-
erogeneity of types among traders of a cluster that satisfy C3(iii). To become familiar
with this construction, consider an economy with two states: S = {WR}. A cluster Aj of
traders with iid Bernoulli beliefs whose beliefs set covers the one-dimensional simplex
(Aj :=⋃i∈	=(01) trader i: ∀tpi(σt =W )= i) has heterogenous types (kMAR = 1) that do
not learn (kBIC = 0), while a cluster AB of Bayesian traders with Uniform priors on the
one-dimensional simplex (	 = (01)) has homogenous types (kMAR = 0) that do learn
(kBIC = 1).8
Finally, a special role in my condition for a cluster to vanish is played by the trader
in the cluster whose beliefs have the highest likelihood on σt .
Definition 7. Trader iˆj(σt) is the maximum-likelihood trader inAj at σt if
iˆj
(
σt
)= arg sup
i∈	j
pi
(
σt
)

4.2 The assumptions
Throughout the paper, I maintain the following assumptions:
A1. All traders have CRRA utilities: ∀i ∈⋃Nj=1Aj , ui(c)= (c1−γi − 1)/(1− γi) with γi ∈
(0∞).
A2. The aggregate endowment is uniformly bounded from above and away from 0.
A3. For all traders h, i, all dates t, and all paths σ , ph(σt) > 0⇔ pi(σt) > 0.
A4. For every cluster, j, ci0 is a differentiable and strictly positive function of i for every
i in the interior of Aj .
Assumption A1 is made for tractability reasons as in Yan (2008). Assumptions A2 and
A3 are standard in the selection literature. Assumption A4 is a smoothness assumption
needed to ensure a good approximation of a cluster’s beliefs around its maximum like-
lihood trader. If the traders in the economy can be organized into finitely many clusters
8In Lemma 3 we show that kMAR is a measure of long-run type heterogeneity; as such, it is not affected
by heterogeneity on the prior distributions: kMAR = 0 in all clusters satisfying C3(ii).
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with identical beliefs, the economy is formally equivalent to a small economy that satis-
fies the (more) general assumptions of Sandroni (2000) and Blume and Easley (2006).
A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of state prices {qt(σ)}∞t=0 and, for each
cluster Aj , a sequence of consumption choices {Cjt (σ)}∞t=0 that is affordable, prefer-
ence maximal on the budget set, and mutually feasible: ∀σ , ∀t, ∑Nj=1 ∫i∈Aj eit(σ)di =∑N
j=1
∫
i∈Aj c
i
t(σ)di. The existence of the competitive equilibrium follows from Ostroy’s
(1984) existence theorem (see Appendix C).
4.3 The reference economy
The economy is a discrete time Arrow–Debreu exchange economy with complete mar-
kets, bounded aggregate endowment, S states, and N clusters Aj , j = 1    N . Every
individual trader in the economy solves
max
{cit (σ)}∞t=0
Epi
∞∑
t=0
βtju
i
(
cit(σ)
)
s.t.
∑
t=0
∑
σ
qt(σ)
(
cit(σ)− eit(σ)
)
)≤ 0
Traders’ first-order conditions of the maximization problem are sufficient for the Pareto
optimum and, in every path σt , can be expressed as (cit (σ))
γj = (ci0)γjβtpi(σt)/qt(σ).
Rearranging and summing over traders of the same cluster yields
∫
Aj
cit(σ)di= β
t
γj
j
∫
Aj
pi
(
σt
) 1
γj ci0 di
qt(σ)
1
γj

Exponentiating both sides by the CRRA parameter and taking the ratio of clusters’ risk-
adjusted consumption, prices cancel:
C
j
t (σ)
γj
Ckt (σ)
γk
=
βtj
(∫
Aj
ci0p
i
(
σt
) 1
γj di
)γj
βtk
(∫
Ak
ci0p
i
(
σt
) 1
γk di
)γk  (5)
The following lemma uses standard arguments from the market selection literature
to show that (5) is the fundamental quantity to determine which cluster vanishes.
Lemma 1. Under A1–A4,Aj vanishes on σ ifAk exists:
βtj
(∫
Aj
ci0p
i
(
σt
) 1
γj di
)γj
βtk
(∫
Ak
ci0p
i
(
σt
) 1
γk di
)γk → 0
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Proof. By A2, Ckt (σ)
γk <∞ ∀k∀σt . Thus by (5), ∀γjγk ∈ (0∞),
C
j
t (σ)
γj
Ckt (σ)
γk
=
βtj
(∫
Aj
pi
(
σt
) 1
γj ci0 di
)γj
βtk
(∫
Ak
pi
(
σt
) 1
γk ci0 di
)γk → 0 ⇔ Cjt (σ)→ 0
Lemma 1 demonstrates that it is the ratio of risk-adjusted aggregate beliefs that de-
termines cluster survival rather than the ratio of cluster aggregate beliefs.
4.4 Technical background
The distinction between risk-adjusted and not risk-adjusted aggregate beliefs is moot
in small economies because for clusters with homogeneous beliefs, the common be-
lief can be factored out of the integral. On the contrary, I find that this distinction
does affect cluster survival in large economies. My results rely on an approximation
of the asymptotic value of (5). This approximation can be seen as a generalization of
a fundamental result about Bayesian accuracy; i.e., the Bayesian information criterion
(BIC) approximation (Schwarz 1978, Clarke and Barron 1990, Ploberger and Phillips
2003, Grünwald 2007). To formally state these results, the following definition is nec-
essary.
Definition 8. Let M be a member of the exponential family parametrized by 	.
• Let 	0 ⊂	. I say that 	0 is regular if
– the interior of 	0 is nonempty
– the closure of 	0 is a compact subset of the interior of 	.
• A sequence σ is 	0-regular if the maximum-likelihood parameter iˆ(σt) exists, it is
unique, and it belongs to the regular set 	0 for all large t.
• The set of all 	0-regular sequences is Sˆ.
• A prior is 	0-regular if it is continuous and strictly positive in 	0.
BIC approximation, Grünwald (2007). Let M be a member of the exponential fam-
ily parametrized by 	, let 	0 be a regular subset of 	, and let pB(σt) be the Bayesian
likelihood obtained from a 	0-regular prior. Then9
∀σ ∈ Sˆ pB(σt)= ∫
	
pi
(
σt
)
gi di= elnpiˆ(σt )(σt)− k
BIC
2 ln t+O(1)
where kBIC is the Lebesgue dimensionality of 	.
9In standard Bayesian notation,
∫
	 p
i(σt)gi di is expressed as
∫
	 p(σ
t |θ)g(θ)dθ.
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The BIC approximation shows that the likelihood of the probabilities obtained via
Bayes’ rule depends on the dimensionality of the prior support (i.e., on the number of
parameters that need to be learned). It formalizes the intuition that there is a likelihood
cost in using models with redundant parameters because some of the information is
“wasted” on learning that the true value of these parameters is zero.10
The following lemma obtains a similar approximation for risk-adjusted aggregate
beliefs.
Lemma 2. Under A1–A4, letMj be the beliefs set of cluster j and let	j0 be a regular subset
of 	j . Then cluster j’s risk-adjusted beliefs satisfy
∀σ ∈ Sˆj
(∫
	j
pi
(
σt
) 1
γj ci0 di
)γj
= elnpiˆ(σt )(σt)−
γjk
MAR
j
2 ln t+O(1)
where kMARj is cluster j’s type dimensionality and γj is its CRRA parameter.
See Appendix B for proofs not given in the main text.
When γ = 1(log), Lemma 2 coincides with the BIC approximation. However, for
γ = 1 and kMAR > 0, Lemma 2 demonstrates that risk-adjusted aggregate probabilities
are not mutually absolutely continuous with respect to their non-risk-adjusted coun-
terparts. In particular, for γ < η, Lemma 2 implies that the ratio of the γ-risk-adjusted
aggregate beliefs and the η-risk-adjusted aggregate beliefs diverge in every sequence. In
economic terms, cluster γ has a higher savings rate than cluster η; thus it dominates.
Importantly, the BIC approximation and Lemma 2 do not depend on the true
data-generating process. They hold, more generally, on every sequence in which the
maximum-likelihood parameter (conditional on the model class Mj) lies in a well be-
haved subset of the parameter space for all large t: Sˆ. Under C3(iii), this set includes
almost all paths. For example, for the multinomial (Markov) iid class with parameters
covering the simplex, Sˆ contains the set of all sequences whose limsup and liminf of the
(conditional) frequencies of events belong to the interior of the simplex. In particular,
P({Sˆj})= 1 for every measure P that does not eventually attach a (conditional) probabil-
ity zero to one of the outcomes.
The approximation of Lemma 2 also holds when kBICj and k
MAR
j = 0, respectively,
which shows that in small economies, risk-adjusted probabilities are mutually abso-
lutely continuous with their non-risk-adjusted counterparts and risk attitudes have no
effect on survival. Moreover, for this case, Sˆj is the set of all paths.
10A classical example is the following. Suppose the true probability is iid Bernoulli with parameter P .
There are two Bayesian traders (B1, B2): B1 has a smooth prior on the Bernoulli family (one parameter,
kBIC1 = 1) and B2 has a smooth prior on the Markov (1) family (two parameters: kBIC2 = 2). Since every iid
model is also Markov 1, the next period forecasts of both traders converge to the true probability. Never-
theless, application of the BIC approximation reveals that B1’s beliefs are empirically more accurate than
B2’s.
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5. Main result
I am now ready to present a general condition for a cluster to vanish that depends only
on exogenous quantities. In the tradition of the selection literature, I assign to every
cluster a survival index. The asymptotic fate of each cluster can be determined by pair-
wise comparison of these indexes.
Definition 9. Cluster’s Aj survival index on σ is
sj = t lnβj +
[
lnpiˆ(σ
t)
j
(
σt
)− kBICj ln√t]− γjkMARj ln√t
The survival index has four terms. The first three terms are standard in the selection
literature: t lnβj is a cluster’s discount factor; [lnpiˆ(σ
t)
j (σ
t) − kBICj ln
√
t] represents the
empirical accuracy of the most accurate trader in the cluster. Specifically, lnpiˆ(σ
t)
j (σ
t)
is the most accurate trader likelihood and kBICj is the BIC dimensionality term, which
equals zero unless traders in Aj are Bayesian traders with kBIC-dimensional prior sup-
port of positive Lebesgue measure. The last term, γjkMARj ln
√
t, is new and appears only
in the large economy setting. It captures the effect of risk attitudes and type dimension-
ality on each cluster’s optimal saving decisions. This term is absent in small economies
because kMARj is zero in homogeneous belief clusters (and in clusters of Bayesians with
regular priors on the same support). The survival indexes determine cluster survival as
follows:
Proposition 1. Under A1–A4, clusterAj vanishes on Sˆj ∩ Sˆk if there is a clusterAk such
that sj − sk → −∞.
The proof is by application of Lemma 1 using Lemma 2 and BIC to approximate the
right-hand side (RHS) of (5).
Proposition 1 links cluster survival to the four components of its survival index.
Keeping the other three components equal, differences in the first component indi-
cate that the least patient cluster vanishes. Differences in the second component in-
dicate that a cluster vanishes if its maximum-likelihood trader (parameter choice if it
is a Bayesian cluster) is less accurate than the maximum-likelihood trader (parameter
choice) of another cluster. Differences in the third component indicate that, given two
Bayesian clusters whose support contains the true probability, the cluster that has to es-
timate more parameters vanishes (as per Theorem 6 in Blume and Easley 2006). In addi-
tion, differences in the last component indicate that the cluster with the lowest γjkMARj
term dominates because it saves more.
These four components have different intensities. The first two components diverge
at rate t, while the last two diverge at rate O(1) ln
√
t. Thus, differences in the first two
components always dominate differences in the other components.11 Therefore, if all
traders have an identical discount factor, the leading term of the survival indexes is the
11Differences in the second two components would disappear if I were to use an average measure of
accuracy as in Sandroni (2000) because they would be dominated by the 1/t term.
452 Filippo Massari Theoretical Economics 14 (2019)
one that captures the empirical accuracy: the market selects for empirically accurate
traders. For the cases in which there is more than one cluster with the most empiri-
cally accurate parameter choice/trader, my condition highlights that risk attitudes can
affect survival not only via direct comparison of the last term of the survival indexes
(Section 5.1), but also via the interaction between its third component, which captures
the parameter dimensionality, and its last component, which captures the interaction
between risk and agent type dimensionality (Section 5.2). This interaction can be re-
sponsible for failures of the MSH.
In the next sections, I discuss specific implications of Proposition 1. Because the
first two components of the survival index are well understood, I focus on economies
in which only the last two components differ, i.e., economies in which all clus-
ters have a homogeneous discount factor (HDF) and the same maximum-likelihood
trader/parameter.
Definition 10. An economy is a HDF if ∀i ∈A, βi = β ∈ (01).
5.1 The role of risk attitudes
To highlight the effect of risk attitudes on cluster survival, I start with the simple case in
which clusters differ only in their risk attitudes.
Proposition 2. In an HDF economy that satisfies A1–A4 with N clusters, with identical
belief sets 	 and kMAR > 0, the least risk-averse cluster dominates on Sˆ.12
Proof. We have that γj < γk ⇒ sk − sj → −∞ ⇒By Th. 1 k vanishes.
Example 2. Consider an Arrow–Debreu exchange economy with two states S = {WR}.
The economy contains two clusters, Aγ and Aη, with an identical discount factor β but
different risk attitudes γ < η. All traders have iid Bernoulli beliefs so that 	η =	γ = {i ∈
(01)} and kMARη = kMARγ = 1. It follows that sη − sγ = γ ln
√
t − η ln√t → −∞ and, by
Proposition 1, the most risk-averse cluster, Aη, vanishes. ♦
Because Aγ and Aη have an identical beliefs set, Example 2 highlights that risk at-
titudes affect cluster survival through their impact on cluster savings rate. In the CRRA
utility specification, the CRRA parameter captures both trader attitudes toward risk and
their attitudes toward intertemporal consumption. Everything else equal, a low CRRA
parameter increases the survival chances of a cluster because it gives higher incentives
to save to its empirically most accurate traders.
The following corollary decomposes the optimal consumption plans of clusters into
their aggregate belief and aggregate discount factor (saving) components.
Corollary 1. Under A1–A4, clusterAj ’s risk-adjusted aggregate beliefs satisfy
βtj
(∫
Aj
pi
(
σt
) 1
γj ci0 di
)γj
=
[∫
Aj
pi
(
σt
)
di
]
∗ [βtj ∗ e−( γjk
MAR−kMAR
2 ) ln t+O(1)]
12Where Sˆ =⋂j∈N Sˆj = Sˆj for j = 1    N , because all clusters have the same belief support.
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The first component represents cluster aggregate beliefs; the second expresses the
cluster aggregate discount factor.
The effect of risk attitudes on aggregate savings can be better understood by focusing
on the recursive version of this competitive equilibrium. Because of the heterogeneity
of trader opinions, in every period most traders subjectively believe that assets are mis-
priced and trade for speculative reasons. If traders have log utility (γ = 1), prices do not
affect optimal investment choices and aggregation does not affect the cluster aggregate
savings rate. The cluster’s optimal choices can be equivalently modeled as those of a rep-
resentative trader with positive mass and discount factor β, and whose beliefs coincide
with the consumption share-weighted average of trader beliefs within the cluster (Ru-
binstein 1974). However, if γ < (>)1, the substitution effect is stronger (weaker) than the
income effect and each member of the cluster optimally chooses to invest more (less) ag-
gressively than if he/she had log utility. Because investing is the only way to save in this
economy, this translates into a representative agent with a higher savings rate. Contrary
to Sandroni (2000) and Blume and Easley (2006), the curvature of preferences matters
because the consumption of an infinitesimal trader can become unbounded, even if the
aggregate consumption is bounded. My results are qualitatively similar to Yan’s (2008)
because, at an infinitesimal level, the consumption shares dynamic of a large economy
resembles that of a growing economy.
5.2 The role of heterogeneity of opinions
In this section, I analyze survival in economies that contain some clusters with hetero-
geneous beliefs (C3(iii)) and some clusters with Bayesian traders (C3(ii)). I show that
cluster beliefs’ dimensionality and risk attitudes, γjkMARj , have an effect on cluster sur-
vival that is of the same order as that of belief dimensionality for a Bayesian cluster, kBICB .
Therefore, they can offset each other. Let us start with the case in which all traders in the
Bayesian cluster have identical priors (C3(i)).
Proposition 3. Under A1–A4, if the economy is HDF and contains only two clusters—
AU , whose traders have heterogeneous beliefs, and AB, whose traders are Bayesian with
identical, regular prior distribution on 	U—then
(i) γU ∈ (01)⇔ clusterAB vanishes ∀σ ∈ Sˆ
(ii) γU = 1⇔ clusterAB survives but does not dominate ∀σ ∈ Sˆ
(iii) γU ∈ (1∞)⇔ clusterAB dominates ∀σ ∈ Sˆ.
The proof is achieved via application of Proposition 1 by noticing that sU − sB =
(kBICB − γUkMARU ) ln
√
t.
Example 3. Consider an Arrow–Debreu exchange economy with two states S = {WR}.
There are two clusters, AU and AB, with identical risk attitudes γ and discount factor
β. Traders in AU have heterogeneous Bernoulli beliefs pi such that 	U = {i ∈ (01)}
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(i.e., kMARU = 1 and kBICU = 0), while traders in AB have identical beliefs pB that are ob-
tained via Bayes’ rule from a regular prior distribution on 	B = (01) (i.e., kMARU = 0 and
kBICU = 1). The result follows as an application of Proposition 1:
∀σ ∈ Sˆ sB − sU = γk
MAR
U
2
ln t − k
BIC
B
2
ln t →
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0 if γ ∈ (01)
r ∈ (0∞) if γ = 1
∞ if γ ∈ (1∞)
The CRRA parameter does not affect the long-run aggregate savings of the Bayesian
cluster because eventually all Bayesian traders agree with the probability implicit in
equilibrium prices and use the market exclusively to smooth consumption rather than
speculate. Conversely, traders in AU never learn the truth and have speculative incen-
tives to trade. Let Bt(iˆ) ∈AU be a shrinking measure of traders with parameters around
the lucky trader. For γ < 1, traders in Bt(iˆ) save more on the realized path than log
traders would (as per Yan’s (2008) result for growing economies), while traders outside
Bt(iˆ) save less than what log traders would save, because they are investing more con-
sumption on paths that do not realize. Proposition 1 ensures that at the aggregate level,
the former effect dominates the latter: the aggregate savings rate of cluster AU is higher
than that of cluster AB.
The next lemma allows us to generalize Proposition 3 to clusters in which traders
have different regular priors over the same support (C3(ii)). Lemma 3 shows that the
dimensionality term of a cluster of Bayesian traders with heterogeneous, regular priors
on the same support equals 0 (kMARBayesian = 0): Bayesian traders with the same prior sup-
port and regular prior have zero type dimensionality because their beliefs eventually
coincide. ♦
Lemma 3. A cluster of Bayesian traders with heterogeneous, regular priors on a common
parameter support, 	, can be treated as a cluster of Bayesian traders with an identical,
regular prior on	.
5.3 The role of the true probability
In Proposition 3, I characterize the long-run consumption share distribution between a
cluster of Bayesian traders and a cluster of traders with heterogeneous beliefs. This re-
sult holds in every path in Sˆ. Therefore, it does not depend on the true data-generating
process and allows (almost) complete freedom in choosing the true distribution. As-
suming that the true probability coincides with the beliefs of the Bayesian cluster and
that γ < 1, we have an economy in which all traders in AB have correct beliefs and yet
cluster AB vanishes: the MSH fails and luck determines which trader survives.
Proposition 4. Under the assumption of Proposition 3, if we further assume that P =
pB and γU < 1, then, with a probability arbitrarily close to 1, the MSH fails and luck
determines which trader survives.
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But what does it mean that the true probability coincides with the probability ob-
tained via Bayes’ rule? The following corollary to de Finetti’s (1937) theorem reminds
the reader that the Pólya urn process in the leading example satisfies this require-
ment: de Finetti’s theorem allows turning the Polya urn process into a probability that
is parametrizable by 	 = [01]: for all (tσ), PPolya(σt) =
∫ 1
0 p
i(σt)di, which coincides
with the probability of a Bayesian with a Uniform prior over the simplex.
Corollary 2. The probability attached by the Pólya urn process in the leading example,
PPolya, coincides in every pathwith the probability obtained by Bayes’ rule fromaUniform
prior on the unit simplex of the Bernoulli iid family, pB:
∀σ∀t PPolya
(
σt
)= ∫ 1
0
pi
(
σt
)
di= pB(σt)
The proof is established by a standard application of de Finetti’s theorem (e.g., Mah-
moud 2008, p. 30).
Similar examples can be constructed as long as the true data-generating process is
exchangeable but not iid; that is, if the true data-generating process is not iid, but the
probability of finite sequences does not depend on the order of the realizations (e.g.,
draws from a deck of cards without replacement).
Definition 11. An infinite sequence of realizations σ∞ is exchangeable if, for every
finite t, P(σ1    σt)= P(σπ(1)    σπ(t)) for any permutation π of the indexes.
From Definition 11, it follows that every sequence of iid random variables, condi-
tional on some underlying distributional form, is exchangeable. de Finetti’s (1937) the-
orem gives us a partially converse statement: every infinite exchangeable sequence can
be characterized as a mixture of iid sequences; that is, every sequence of exchangeable
random variables has a representation of the form p(σt) = ∫	pi(σt)gi di, where the pi
are iid probability measures and gi is the weight assigned to each model. Interpreting
gi as a prior distribution in the Bayesian sense, this representation implies that to every
Bayesian model (with obvious generalization to a non-iid setting), there is a correspond-
ing exchangeable (conditionally exchangeable) model and vice versa.
In the words of Kreps (1988), “. . . exchangeability is the same as ‘independent and
identically distributed with a prior unknown distribution function’. . . ”
In the leading example, skilled traders have rational expectations because they know
the “unknown” distribution function.
These observations can be used to construct other examples in which the MSH fails
and luck is the sole determinant of trader survival.
Example 4. Consider an Arrow–Debreu exchange economy with two states S = {WR}.
The true probability P evolves according to the same Pólya urn process I used in my
leading example. There are two clusters, AS and AU , with an identical discount factor β.
Traders in AS (skilled traders) are Bayesian with Uniform priors on 	S = (01) (kBICS = 1),
so that by Corollary 2, P = pB. Traders in AU (unskilled traders), have heterogeneous
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Markov 1 beliefs pi such that 	U = {i ∈ (01)2}. Note that kMAR = 2 (the Markov 1 model
has two parameters to be estimated: p(W |R) andp(W |W )) and that the Bernoulli model
is nested in the Markov 1 model: 	S ⊂ 	U . It is easy to verify that sS − sU = (−kBICS +
γUk
MAR
U ) ln
√
t = (−1+ 2γU) ln
√
t; thus, if γU < 05, skilled traders vanish, the MSH fails,
and a lucky trader dominates. ♦
In Example 4, a value of γ smaller than in the leading example is needed to deter-
mine a failure of the MSH. This reflects the intuition that a qualitatively equal amount of
aggregate consumption needs to be shared between a qualitatively larger set of traders
in a Markov 1 cluster (kMARM1 = 2) rather than an iid cluster (kMARIID = 1). Accordingly, the
lucky trader in the Markov cluster must be given more incentives to save than the lucky
trader in the iid cluster because he gets a smaller infinitesimal share of the cluster’s initial
consumption.
5.4 Necessary conditions for a violation of the MSH
I have presented two examples in which the MSH fails. These examples have three el-
ements in common: a large number of traders, preferences that are sufficiently elastic,
and a data-generating process such that the true maximum-likelihood parameter is a
random variable with continuum support. All these requirements are necessary for a
violation of the MSH.
Proposition 5. In an HDF economy that satisfies A1–A4, if a skilled clusterAS vanishes
P-a.s., then the following statements hold:
(a) At least one cluster,Aj , has heterogeneous traders.
(b) ClusterAj ’s trader preferences are sufficiently elastic: γj ≤ 1.
(c) The true maximum-likelihood parameter is a random variable with continuum
support; that is, kBICP > 0.
A large number of traders is necessary because luck can occur only if there is enough
heterogeneity in trader beliefs; otherwise we are in the small economy setting of San-
droni (2000) and Blume and Easley (2006) in which skilled clusters survive P-a.s. Pref-
erences that are sufficiently elastic are necessary to give the lucky traders in Aj enough
incentive to save (as per Proposition 3). Condition (c) is necessary for Aj ’s survival index
to be higher than that of the skilled cluster’s, AS . If the maximum-likelihood parame-
ters of the true data-generating process were constants (or random variables with finite
support), then AS would have maximal survival index because both its BIC and MAR
components equal 0.
6. Markets are asymptotically efficient
In this section, I prove that the equilibrium prices of short-period assets eventually re-
flect correct beliefs whenever there is a skilled cluster.
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Proposition 6. In an HDF economy that satisfies A1–A4, if there is a cluster of traders
with correct beliefs, asymptotic prices are efficient: the prices of short-lived assets converge
to the discounted, risk-adjusted beliefs of a trader with correct beliefs,
∀σ ∈ Sˆ
∥∥∥∥q(σt |σt−1)− u
iˆ(σt−1)(ciˆ(σt)t−1 (σ))′
uiˆ(σ
t−1)(ciˆ(σt)t (σ))′βP
(
σt |σt−1
)∥∥∥∥∞ → 0
where q(σt |σt−1) = qt(σ)/qt−1(σ) is the price to move a unit of consumption from
date/event σt−1 to date event σt and ‖ · ‖∞ is the sup norm.
For the usual case in which the MSH holds, and the skilled cluster dominates, the
result follows from standard economic arguments (Sandroni 2000). More interesting
is the observation that markets become efficient even if the MSH fails and the skilled
cluster vanishes. The result is implied by four intuitive claims: first, a cluster that van-
ishes does not affect next-period equilibrium prices, as per Sandroni (2000); second,
among traders of the dominating cluster, consumption shares concentrate around the
lucky trader (Proposition 5.3); third, the beliefs of non-lucky traders do not affect next-
period equilibrium prices; fourth, the beliefs of the lucky trader are eventually accurate,
because the leading component of the survival index is empirical accuracy and lucky
traders are competing against a skilled cluster. Moreover, under the smoothness en-
sured by C3 and A4, the empirically accurate beliefs must weakly merge with the true
probability.13
7. Conclusions
This paper extends the work started by Sandroni (2000) and Blume and Easley (2006)
on market selection to the large economy setting. This generalization alters some of
the basic implications of their model: in large economies, risk attitudes do affect trader
survival and the MSH can fail. I provide a formal definition of luck and show that risk
attitudes determine whether the market rewards for skills or luck. When the market
selects for luck over skills, I have a violation of the MSH that is qualitatively different
from cases found in previous literature. Although markets select against traders with
correct beliefs, equilibrium prices of short-lived assets are asymptotically accurate.
Appendix A: Reconciling small and large economies
A large economy in which all clusters have traders with identical beliefs is formally
equivalent to a small economy. In this case, the risk/dimensionality component in the
13Proposition 6, together with Example 1, could foster the incorrect conjecture that my result implies that
the market can achieve perfect foresight on iid coin tosses. This conjecture is incorrect and not consistent
with my result for at least two reasons: first, the competitive equilibrium does not exist with a belief struc-
ture like that in Example 1 (Ostroy 1984); it violates my definition of cluster C3. Second, the approximation
of the integral of Lemma 2 requires enough smoothness ((C3) and (A4)) around the maximum-likelihood
trader in each cluster (Schwarz 1978). This assumption is violated when trader beliefs are Dirac deltas on
single sequences.
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survival indexes of every cluster is moot (kMAR = 0) and, consistent with Sandroni (2000)
and Blume and Easley (2006), I find that risk attitudes do not play a role in survival.
Proposition 7. In a small HDF economy that satisfies A1–A4, for all σ ∈ Sˆ, irrespective
of risk attitudes, the market selects for the most accurate trader.
Proof. Apply Proposition 1: in a small economy, for all j = 1    N , kMARj = 0.
The different implications of risk attitudes on survival for large and small economies
can be puzzling. Although Proposition 7 applies to economies with an arbitrarily large
number of traders, Proposition 3 implies that it is not valid in large economies. This
apparent contradiction disappears if, instead of focusing on vanishing versus surviv-
ing (i.e., on the dichotomous distinction between zero versus nonzero asymptotic con-
sumption shares), we look at the size of the asymptotic consumption shares.
Propositions 8 and 9 show that the results of Propositions 3 and 4 hold, approxi-
mately, for some small economies with a large number of traders. As intuition suggests,
the discrepancy between the small and large setting is narrower when the small econ-
omy has a large number of traders.
Proposition 8. For all γU ∈ (0∞) and for all  > 0, there exists a nˆ(gC0) such that
in every small HDF economy with 2n > 2nˆ traders that satisfies A1–A4 with a group
of traders, AU , with heterogeneous beliefs AU = {p1    pn} and common CRRA util-
ity with parameter γU and n Bayesian traders, AB, with prior G := [g1     gn] on AU ,
ci0 =O(n−1) for all i and gj =O(n−1) for all j,14 such that the following inequalities hold
∀σ ∈ Sˆ∗:
(i) γU ∈ (01)⇔ limt→∞ CB(σt)CB(σt)+CU(σt) < ,
(ii) γU = 1⇔ limt→∞ CB(σt)CB(σt)+CU(σt) ∈ (1− ),
(iii) γU ∈ (1∞)⇔ limt→∞ CB(σt)CB(σt)+CU(σt) > 1− ,
where Sˆ∗ is the set of sequences in which the Bayesian posterior eventually concentrates
on a model in its support: Sˆ∗ := {σ : ∃i ∈AU : i = j ∈AU ⇒ limt→∞pi(σt)/pj(σt)= 0}.
Example 5. Small economy analog of Example 3. Consider a small economy with two
states S = {WR}, no aggregate risk, and 2n traders with time zero consumption (2n)−1.
Traders 1     n, group AU , have a CRRA parameter γU and heterogeneous iid Bernoulli
beliefs: {p1(w)    pn(w)} = {1/n     (n − 1)/n1}. Traders n + 1    2n are Bayesian
traders, group AB, with Uniform prior G on AU = {⋃ni=1pi} (i.e., for all (tσ), pB(σt)=∑n
i=1pi(σt)/n) and CRRA parameter γB. ♦
14We have that ci0 = O(n−1) for all i and gj = O(n−1) for all j are the finite analogs of the smoothness
requirements on clusters’ time zero consumption and on the Bayesian prior, respectively.
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Rearranging the first order conditions (FOC) as for (5) and working through the no-
tation
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Because (2γU−γB) ∈ (0∞), ∀ > 0, ∃n¯: n > n¯ implies the condition of Proposition 8.
Proposition 9. Under the conditions of Proposition 8, if I further assume P = pB,
maxi gi < , and γU < 1, then
(i) ∀i ∈AUP{σ : limt→∞ p
i(σt)
P(σt)
> 0}< ;
(ii) limt→∞ CB(σ
t)
CB(σt)+CU(σt) <  P-a.s.;
(iii) ∃iˆ(σ) ∈AU : limt→∞ c
iˆ(σ)
t (σ)
CB(σt)+CU(σt) > 1−  P-a.s.
The intuition mimics that presented in Section 3.2. The data-generating process can
be understood as describing this two-step procedure. In the first step, Nature random-
izes according to g to decide the probability of red: P(R). In the second step, Nature
uses P(R) to generate an iid sequence of length t. While traders in AB know that Na-
ture is randomizing over AU according to g, each trader in AU is dogmatically sure that
15The convergence occurs by definition of Sˆ∗.
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his model is the correct one, an event whose true probability is smaller than . Because
Nature’s choice is restricted to models in AU , exactly one trader in AU is empirically
accurate, iˆ. For large n, this trader is “almost lucky” (his ex ante probability of being
empirically accurate is at most ) and “almost dominates” (his asymptotic consumption
share is above 1− ).
Examples 3 and 5 highlight the role played by risk attitudes and belief set dimension-
ality in small and large economies.
Risk attitudes affect the asymptotic consumption shares distribution through their
effect on the concentration rate of consumption shares: lower values of γ determine
a faster consumption shares concentration rate and thus lower asymptotic consump-
tion shares for the Bayesian cluster. The dimensionality of AU affects cluster survival
through its effect on the concentration rate of both the Bayesian posterior and the con-
sumption shares as follows. If |A| < |N|, both convergence rates are exponential; the
Bayesian measure and the aggregate risk-adjusted measure are mutually absolutely con-
tinuous and the Bayesian survives without dominating. If |A| = |R|, both convergence
rates are slower than exponential (they are, respectively, O(t−
kBIC
2 ) and O(t−
kMAR
2γ )), the
two measures are not mutually absolutely continuous, and clusters’ survival depends on
γ, kBIC and kMAC.
Appendix B: Proofs
I make use of the notations o(·), O(·), and ∼ with the meanings
f (x) = o(g(x)) abbreviates lim
x→∞
f (x)
g(x)
→ 0
f (x) = O(g(x)) abbreviates lim sup f (x)
g(x)
<+∞
f (x) ∼ g(x) abbreviates lim f (x)
g(x)
= 1
Proof of Lemma 2. We need to show that(∫
Aj
pi
(
σt
) 1
γj ci0 di
)γj
= elnpiˆ(σt )(σt)−
γjk
MAR
j
2 ln t+O(1)
The result follows from Lemma 5 by substituting Aj for A, multiplying by γj , exponen-
tiating, and ignoring the constant terms.
The proof of Lemmas 4 and 5 follows the steps of Grünwald’s (2007, p. 248) proof of
the BIC (if γ = 1 and c0 is a density, the two proofs coincide).
Lemma 4. LetM be a member of the exponential family parametrized byA and let ci0 be
a function that satisfies A4. Then
ln
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
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where D(piˆ(σ
t)‖pi) = E
piˆ(σ
t ) lnpiˆ(σ
t)/pi is the Kullback–Leibler divergence from pi to
piˆ(σ
t).
Proof.
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For example, if pi(σt = 1)= i is iid Bernoulli, the result follows because
lnpi
(
σt
)− lnpiˆ(σt)(σt)= t
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Lemma 5. LetM be a member of the exponential family parametrized byA and let ci0 be
a function that satisfies A4. Then, ∀σ ∈ Sˆ,
ln
∫
A
pi
(
σt
) 1
γ ci0 di =
1
γ
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where I(piˆ(σ
t)) is the Fisher information evaluated at piˆ(σ
t).
Proof. By Lemma 4,
ln
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
WLOG, let us focus on the case in which M is the iid Bernoulli family, so that pi = i and
kA = 1.16 Let Bt = {i ∈ [iˆ(σt)− t− 12+α iˆ(σt)+ t− 12+α]} with 0 < α < 12 . To gain intuition,
take α very small, so that Bt is a neighborhood of the maximum likelihood that shrinks
to 0 at a rate slightly slower than (
√
t)−1. Because σ ∈ Sˆ, Bt concentrates around iˆ, and
because ci0 is continuous and strictly positive in A, there is a T : ∀t > T , Bt ⊂ A0 where
A0 is a compact subset of A in which ci0 > 0. I always assume t > T .
16The generalization to the multinomial case and non-iid intertemporal structures is straightforward.
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By additivity of the integral,
∫
A
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− tγ D(piˆ(σ
t )‖pi)
ci0 di=
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A\Bt
e
− tγ D(piˆ(σ
t )‖pi)
ci0 di+
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ci0 di
The proof is done by performing a second-order Taylor expansion of D(piˆ(σ
t))‖pi)
to bound the two integrals. The M is a member of the exponential family (Bernoulli in
my case); thus, by the results in Chapter 19 of Grünwald (2007), D(piˆ‖P) can be well
approximated in B as
D
(
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t)‖pi)= 1
2
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for some i∗ ∈ Bt such that i∗ lies between i and iˆ.
(†) First integral: ∃ka <∞ : I1 =
∫
A\Bt e
− tγ D(piˆ(σ
t )‖pi)
ci0 di < ke
−at2α → 0.
Remember that D(piˆ(σ
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By (6) and the definition of Bt ,
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where i′ depends on i. Using the definitions above, I get
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I now perform the substitutions z = (iˆ(σt)−i)
√
tI+t /γ on the left integral and z = (iˆ(σt)−
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tI−t /γ on the right integral to get
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I now recognize both integrals as standard Gaussian. Because, as t → ∞, I−t → I(piˆ),
and I+t → I(piˆ), the domain of integration tends to infinity for both integrals, so that
they both converge to
√
2π. Since c+t → ciˆ0 and c−t → ciˆ0, the constant in both integrals
converges to ciˆ0(
√
tI(piˆ)/γ)−1 and I get I2 ∼
√
2πciˆ0(
√
tI(piˆ)/γ)−1.
Putting † and ‡ together yields
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Note that the approximation holds uniformly for all σt ∈ Sˆ because (i) the bound on I1
does not depend on σt , and (ii) convergence of I2 is uniform because ci0 and I(pi) are
continuous functions of i over the compact set A0.
Proof of Corollary 1.
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Proof of Lemma 3. Let Aγ be a positive mass of Bayesian traders with regular pri-
ors, gi(θ), on the same k-dimensional parameter space 	. I have to show that their
risk-adjusted aggregate beliefs are equivalent to the beliefs of a cluster of Bayesian
traders with an identical regular prior f on 	 : pB(σt). Let g¯ = supiθ∈int	 gi(θ) and
g = infiθ∈int	 gi(θ). Note that g > 0, because the prior distribution of every trader in Aγ
is strictly positive, and note that g¯ <∞ because all of the gis are continuous in the sim-
plex and thus bounded in its (strict) interior. Because the convergence result of Lemma 5
is uniform, it follows that(∫
Aγ
ci0p
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σt
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γ di
)γ
=
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Proof of Proposition 4. Let us focus WLOG on the Bernoulli case: pB(σt) =∫ 1
0 p
i(σt)gi di.
For the most part, Proposition 4 coincides with Proposition 3. I need to show only
two additional things: (a) the MSH fails with a probability arbitrarily close to 1, i.e., ∀ >
0, pB(Sˆ) > 1− , and (b) lucky traders dominate.
Part (a). By assumption, gi is regular and thus continuous on (01). Therefore, the
probability that the gi gives to the set of parameters in the strict interior of the prior
support is arbitrarily close to 1: ∀ > 0, ∃1 > 0 : pg(i ∈ (11− 1)) > 1− . By the strong
law of large numbers, i ∈ (11 − 1) ⇒ iˆ(σ) ∈ Sˆ pi-a.s. so that ∀1 > 0, pB(Sˆ) ≥ pg(i ∈
(11− 1)). Thus, ∀ > 0, ∃1 > 0 : pB(Sˆ)≥ pg(i ∈ (11− 1)) > 1− .
Part (b). Let iˆ(σt) be the beliefs of the maximum-likelihood trader in the cluster that
dominates (A) and let {Bt(iˆ)}∞t=1 be the following sequence of shrinking subclusters of
A: Bt(iˆ)= {i ∈ [iˆ(σt)− t− 12+α iˆ(σt)+ t− 12+α]} for 0< α < 12 . Rearranging (5) and using †
and ‡ from the proof of Lemma 5 yields
lim
t→∞
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cit (σ)di∫
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cit (σ)di
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c0 di
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Thus, by Lemma 1, consumption shares concentrate in the shrinking interval Bt(iˆ)
around piˆ(σ
t). The market selects for luck because
• limt→∞ supi∈Bt(iˆ) ‖i− iˆ‖ = 0, i.e., the market rewards an empirically accurate trader
• ∫A limt→∞ IBt gi di= 0, i.e., trader iˆ is not a priori accurate.
Proof of Proposition 5. Let AS be a skilled cluster.
Part (a) is necessary for AS to vanish P-a.s. By contradiction, in a small economy, AS
survives P-a.s. (Sandroni 2000).
Part (b) is necessary for AS to vanish P-a.s. By contradiction, if γj > 1 for all clusters
in the economy, then sj − ss → −∞ ∀j = s and As dominates by Proposition 1.
Part (c) is necessary for AS to vanish P-a.s. By contradiction, if kBICP = 0, then AS has
the maximal survival index because kMARS = 0 and it survives by Proposition 1.
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Proof of Proposition 6. If the skilled cluster dominates, the convergence follows
from standard economic arguments (Sandroni 2000). Otherwise, the result follows by
proving the following four claims.
Claim 1. A cluster that vanishes does not affect next-period equilibrium prices.
Claim 2. Among traders of the dominating cluster, consumption shares concentrate
around the lucky trader.
Claim 3. The beliefs of non-lucky traders do not affect equilibrium prices.
Claim 4. The beliefs of the lucky trader are eventually accurate, because they need to beat
a skilled cluster.
Let C¯, β¯, γ¯, and A¯ be the aggregate consumption, discount factor, CRRA parameter,
and belief set of the cluster with the highest survival index, j¯, respectively.
Proof of Claim 1. We have
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Equation (7) obeys the asymptotic
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) 1
γj ci0 di
)γj
β¯t−1
(∫
A¯
ci0p
i
(
σt−1
) 1
γ¯ di
)γ¯
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=(b) C¯t−1(σ)
γ¯ + o(1)
C¯t(σ)
γ¯ + o(1)
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
β¯
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
∫
A¯
pi
(
σt
) 1
γ¯ ci0 di∫
A¯
pi
(
σt−1
) 1
γ¯ ci0 di
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
γ¯
+ o(1)
1+ o(1)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

By Proposition 1, j = j¯ ⇒ Cjt (σ)γj = o(1). By Lemma 5,
j = j¯ ⇒
βtj
(∫
Aj
pi
(
σt
) 1
γj ci0 di
)γj
β¯t
(∫
A¯
ci0p
i
(
σt
) 1
γ¯ di
)γ¯ = o(1)

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Proof of Claim 2. We have
∀σ ∈ Sˆ sup
i∈C¯t−1
∥∥∥∥c
i
t−1(σ)
γ¯
cit (σ)
γ¯
− c
iˆ(σt)
t−1 (σ)
ciˆ(σ
t)
t (σ)
∥∥∥∥→ 0
Let {B¯T }∞T=1 be a sequence of subsets of A¯ centered around iˆ as in the proof of Lemma 4
but with T = o(t) and B¯cT = A¯ \ B¯T its complement, and let C¯B¯T (σ) and C¯B¯cT (σ) be the
aggregate consumption of traders in BT and BcT , respectively. By Lemma 5, †, and ‡,
C¯B¯cT
(σ)/C¯B¯T (σ)→ 0 for every T . Thus,
C¯t−1(σ)γ¯
C¯t(σ)
γ¯
=
(
C¯B¯Tt (σ)+CB¯cTt (σ)
)γ¯
(
C¯B¯Tt−1(σ)+CB¯cTt−1(σ)
)γ¯
∈
{ min{c ∈ C¯B¯Tt (σ)}
max
{
c ∈ C¯B¯Tt−1(σ)
} − o(1) max
{
c ∈ C¯B¯Tt (σ)
}
min{c ∈ C¯B¯Tt−1(σ)}
+ o(1)
}
→a c
iˆ(σt)
t (σ)
ciˆ(σ
t)
t−1 (σ)

The limit follows because supi∈B¯Tt−1 ‖iˆ(σt−1)− i‖ →tT→∞ 0 uniformly and ci is differen-
tiable in i. 
Proof of Claim 3. We have
∀σ ∈ Sˆ
∥∥∥∥
(∫
A¯
pi
(
σt
) 1
γ¯ ci0 di∫
A¯
pi
(
σt−1
) 1
γ¯ ci0 di
)γ¯
− p¯iˆ(σt )(σt |σt−1)
∥∥∥∥∞ → 0
(∫
A¯
pi
(
σt
) 1
γ¯ ci0 di∫
A¯
pi
(
σt−1
) 1
γ¯ ci0 di
)γ¯
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
∫
B¯t
e
− tγ D(piˆ(σ
t )‖pi)
ci0 di+
∫
A¯\B¯t
e
− tγ D(piˆ(σ
t )‖pi)
ci0 di∫
B¯t−1
e
− tγ D(piˆ(σ
t )‖pi)
ci0 di+
∫
A¯\B¯t−1
e
− tγ D(piˆ(σ
t )‖pi)
ci0 di
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
γ
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
∫
B¯t
e
− tγ D(piˆ(σ
t )‖pi)
ci0 di+ o
(∫
B¯t−1
e
− tγ D(piˆ(σ
t )‖pi)
ci0 di
)
∫
B¯t−1
e
− t−1γ D(piˆ(σ
t−1)‖pi)
ci0 di+ o
(∫
B¯t−1
e
− t−1γ D(piˆ(σ
t−1)‖pi)
ci0 di
)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
γ
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∈
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
inf
i∈B¯t−1
pi
(
σt
)
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
√
2πci0√
t
I
(
pi
)
γ
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
γ
sup
i∈B¯t−1
pi
(
σt−1
)
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
√
2πci0√
(t − 1)I
(
pi
)
γ
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
γ − o(1);
sup
i∈B¯t−1
pi
(
σt
)
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
√
2πci0√
t
I
(
pi
)
γ
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
γ
inf
i∈B¯t−1
pi
(
σt−1
)
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
√
2πci0√
(t − 1)I
(
pi
)
γ
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
γ + o(1)
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
∈
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
inf
i∈B¯t−1
pi
(
σt |σt−1
)
inf
i∈B¯t−1
pi
(
σt−1
)
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
√
2πci0√
t
I
(
pi
)
γ
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
γ
sup
i∈B¯t−1
pi
(
σt−1
)
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
√
2πci0√
(t − 1)I
(
pi
)
γ
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
γ − o(1);
sup
i∈B¯t−1
pi
(
σt |σt−1
)
sup
i∈B¯t−1
pi
(
σt−1
)
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
√
2πci0√
t
I
(
pi
)
γ
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
γ
inf
i∈B¯t−1
pi
(
σt−1
)
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
√
2πci0√
(t − 1)I
(
pi
)
γ
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
γ + o(1)
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
→a p¯iˆ(σt−1)(σt |σt−1)
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Because ∃T < ∞ : ∀t > T , ∀i ∈ Bt−1, pi(σt), pi(σt−1), I(pi), and ci0 are all differentiable
and strictly positive functions of i, and supi∈B¯t−1 ‖iˆ(σt−1)− i‖ → 0 uniformly. 
Proof of Claim 4. We have
∀σ ∈ Sˆ ∥∥P(σt |σt−1)−piˆ(σt−1)(σt |σt−1)∥∥∞ → 0
I can have a violation of the MSH involving a positive mass of traders only if there is
a cluster j such that P = pj . Moreover, by Proposition 5, this can happen only if P =∫
	j
pigi di with 	j with a positive Lebesgue measure. Finally, the empirical accuracy
term dominates the cluster dimensionality and the BIC dimensionality term, so only a
cluster with an empirically accurate trader can dominate a cluster with correct beliefs.
Therefore, it must be the case that the maximum-likelihood parameter according to P ,
piˆ(σ
t)
P , and the maximum-likelihood trader of the competing unskilled cluster coincide:
piˆ(σ
t)
P = p¯iˆ(σ
t). The result follows by applying the proof of Claim 3 (with γ = 1) to the true
probability, P(σt |σt−1):
lim
t→∞
∥∥P(σt |σt−1)− p¯iˆ(σt)(σt |σt−1)∥∥∞
:= lim
t→∞
∥∥∥∥
∫
	J
pi
(
σt
)
gi0 di∫
	J
pi
(
σt−1
)
gi0 di
− p¯iˆ(σt)(σt |σt−1)
∥∥∥∥∞
= lim
t→∞
∥∥piˆ(σt)P (σt |σt−1)− p¯iˆ(σt)(σt |σt−1)∥∥∞ = 0
Because the convergence results in Claims 1–4 are all uniform, I obtain the desired re-
sult:
∀σ ∈ Sˆ
∥∥∥∥q(σt |σt−1)− u
iˆ(σt−1)(ciˆ(σt)t−1 (σ))′
uiˆ(σ
t−1)(ciˆ(σt)t (σ))′βP
(
σt |σt−1
)∥∥∥∥∞ → 0
Proof of Proposition 8. Let WLOG p1 be the model on which pB concentrates. Re-
arranging the FOC as for (5) and working through the notation yields
CB
(
σt
)γB
CU
(
σt
)γU =
(∑
i∈AB
ci0p
B
(
σt
) 1
γB
)γB
(∑
i∈AU
ci0p
i
(
σt
) 1
γU
)γU
=
( 2n∑
i=n+1
ci0
)γB
pB
(
σt
)
(
n∑
i=1
ci0p
i
(
σt
) 1
γU
)γU
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=
( 2n∑
i=n+1
ci0
)γB n∑
i=1
gipi
(
σt
)
(
n∑
i=1
ci0p
i
(
σt
) 1
γU
)γU
=
( 2n∑
i=n+1
ci0
)γB(
g1 +
n∑
i=2
gi
pi
(
σt
)
p1
(
σt
)
)
(
c1 +
n∑
i=2
ci
pi
(
σt
)
p1
(
σt
)
)γU
= O(1) g
1 + ot(1)(
c1 + ot(1)
)γU =O(nγU−1) for all large t for all σ ∈ Sˆ∗
Thus, for all large t, for all σ ∈ Sˆ∗
lim
n→∞
CB
(
σt
)γB
CU
(
σt
)γU =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0 if γU ∈ (01)
K ∈ (0∞) if γU = 1
∞ if γU ∈ (1∞)
The result follows because for all large t, for all σ ∈ Sˆ∗,
CB
(
σt
)+CU(σt) ∈ (0∞)
⇒
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
CB
(
σt
)γB
CU
(
σt
)γU → 0 ⇔ CB
(
σt
)
CB
(
σt
)+CU(σt) → 0;
CB
(
σt
)γB
CU
(
σt
)γU →K ∈ (0∞) ⇔ CB
(
σt
)
CB
(
σt
)+CU(σt) →K ∈ (0∞);
CB
(
σt
)γB
CU
(
σt
)γU → ∞ ⇔ CB
(
σt
)
CB
(
σt
)+CU(σt) → 1
Proof of Proposition 9. (i) For all i ∈ AU , P{σ : limt→∞pi(σt)/P(σt) > 0} =
gi < . Because, by assumption, ∀i, the prior attaches probability gi <  to those
sequences to which pi gives probability 1.
(ii) We have P = pB ⇒ P({Sˆ∗})= 1. Thus, Proposition 8(i) becomes
CB
(
σt
)
CB
(
σt
)+CU(σt) <  P-a.s.
(iii) We have P = pB ⇒ P({Sˆ∗})= 1. Thus, Proposition 8(i) implies
lim
t→∞
CU
(
σt
)
CB
(
σt
)+CU(σt) > 1−  P-a.s.
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Moreover, Massari’s (2017) necessary and sufficient condition for a trader to vanish
implies that only one trader, i, in AU survives P-a.s., and the result follows by noticing
that
lim
t→∞
ci
(
σt
)
CB
(
σt
)+CU(σt) = limt→∞
CU
(
σt
)
CB
(
σt
)+CU(σt) > 1−  P-a.s.
Appendix C: Existence of the competitive equilibrium
To prove the existence of the competitive equilibrium, I will show that my assumptions
guarantee that the economy satisfies Ostroy’s (1984) sufficient conditions for the exis-
tence of a competitive equilibrium. According to Ostroy (1984), a large economy is a pair
(W0), where  describes preferences and W0 defines an initial allocation of commodi-
ties to a group of traders. Ostroy’s (1984) theorem shows that the competitive equilib-
rium exists in economies that satisfy three sets of assumptions: on the commodity space
(Y.1), on the aggregate preferences (S.1–S.7), and the initial allocation of commodities
(T.1–T.2).
• Assumption Y.1 requires that the commodity space has an “order compatible” ba-
sis. This assumption is satisfied if the commodity space contains only countably
many elements. Assumption C3 ensures that this is indeed the case:
Lemma 6. For all C3⇒ the commodity space is countable.
Proof. If all traders have exchangeable beliefs (either Bayesian or iid)—conditionally
exchangeable if the beliefs have a Markov structure—they can only distinguish con-
sumption by the length of the sequence and the average number of realizations (con-
ditional average number of realizations if Markov). Because the length of the sequence
and and the average number of realizations belong to countable sets, N and Q, respec-
tively, the equilibrium consumption allocations need only to span a countable space
and the orthonormal basis exists.17
• Assumptions S1–S7 are regularity assumptions on preferences. They are implied
by C2 and A1, which require common CRRA preferences among traders of the
same cluster.
• Assumptions T1 and T2 are regularity conditions on the measurability of the initial
allocation. They are satisfied by assuming that the initial allocations are described
by a Lebesgue measurable function (C1). This function represents the initial equi-
librium consumption shares (i.e., the inverse of the risk-adjusted Pareto weight).
Assumption A3 is necessary to rule out difficulties that can arise if agents have or-
thogonal beliefs on finite horizons. Assumptions A2 and A4 are ancillary to the existence
of the competitive equilibrium, but are useful for its characterization.
17The belief structure of Example 1 violates this requirement: assuming Dirac measures on every se-
quence requires the commodity space to be large enough to distinguish between every sequence. There-
fore, in Example 1, the commodity space is the space of all binary sequences with the sup norm, and the
equilibrium does not exist because this space does not have an orthonormal basis.
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